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THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
BROAD APPROACH TO INCOME IN
JAMES V. UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
Although federal taxation has always been governed by a com-
prehensive code, tax principles developed by the courts supple-
ment or even dominate its provisions. Basic to federal income
taxation is section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which states,
"gross income means all income from whatever source derived."1
The courts have utilized several different theories to define what
constitutes income, but these theories have not been carefully ap-
plied. The purpose of this Comment is to analyze an important
income tax theory developed by the Supreme Court in James v.
United States, and to show that proper explication of the broad
theory of income adopted in James may provide a consistent judi-
cial approach to income.
I. BEFORE JAMES: THE CLAIM OF RIGHT DOCTRINE
Narrowly perceived, James is merely the fullest development
of a tax theory known as the claim of right doctrine,3 first adopted
by the Court in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet.4 In
that case the right to certain revenue had been the subject of a
legal dispute between the taxpayer and the federal government.
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the money had
been awarded to the taxpayer. The sole question before the Su-
preme Court was when the taxpayer was required to include the
monies in his gross income. The Court considered three alterna-
tives: Year 1, when the monies were being held by'a receiver pend-
ing the trial court's resolution of the conflict; Year 2, when, after
the trial court found in favor of the taxpayer, he demanded and
acquired the monies from the receiver; and Year 3, when the trial
court's decree became final after the period for appeal from the
appellate court's decision had passed.
1. I.R.C. § 61.
2. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
3. For a good discussion of the claim of right doctrine at its apex, see Webster,
The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10 TAx L. REv. 381 (1955).
4. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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The Court used a two-part test. First, it considered whether
the taxpayer had made a "claim of right" to the money. It was not
clear if the Court meant to inquire whether the taxpayer had a
colorable legal claim to the money, or merely whether he had ex-
ercised control over the money.5 On the facts of the case either
test was met. Second, the Court looked to whether, after the tax-
payer had received the money, his use of it was subject to sub-
stantial restrictions.' Fulfillment of the second requirement would
belie the assumption of gain and exempt the funds from income
taxation. The Court said:
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he
is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he
is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still
be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.7
The tax, therefore, was due in Year 2, when the taxpayer first be-
came entitled to the money and in fact actually received it.
It has been asserted that the doctrine developed in North
American has little to do with the question of what is income, but
is useful only for ascertaining the year to which income should be
assigned." Such an interpretation would make inclusion of the
monies in one year await determination of the ownership of the
funds.9.Rather, North American rejected this possibility0 and es-
tablished the proposition that the taxpayer has income in Year 2
whether or not his claim to the money is eventually upheld.
In Commissioner v. Wilcox," the Supreme Court was pre-
sented with the problem of whether the claim of right doctrine
5. After North American, but before the Supreme Court's next treatment of the
problem, Judge Learned Hand, in National City Bank of New York v. Helvering, 98 F.2d
93, 96 (2d Cir. 1938), defined claim of right in terms of possession of money and indi-
vidual intent to control it, regardless of the legal validity of the possessor's claims.
6. Though the Court did not give any examples of substantial restrictiong, the
paradigm is a bailment. See also I.R.C. § 83, which exempts the receipt of property from a
corporation from income taxation when received with substantial restrictions.
7. 286 US. at 424.
8. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. at 216 n.7 (Court commenting upon the
Commissioner's argument). See also Webster, supra note 3, at 384-85.
9. See Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953), which required the taxpayer
to include money in income even though his claim was later found to be mistaken and
he was required to repay it.
10. The Court concluded, "(ilf in 1922 the Government had prevailed, and the
company had been obliged to refund the profits received in 1917, it would have been
entitled to a deduction from the profits of 1922, not from those of any earlier year."
286 U.S. at 424.
11. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
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required an embezzler to include his wrongful appropriations in
his gross income. The Court examined North American and again
determined that a taxpayer must have a "claim of right" to money
before it becomes income to him. The facts of Wilcox forced the
Court to define more clearly the relationship that gives rise to tax
liability. The Court held that the taxpayer would be liable only if
he had taken the money under a colorable legal claim.
Focusing on the relationships of the embezzler and of his vic-
tim to the funds, the Court concluded that there was no gain to
the embezzler. To be income, money must be received without
"a definite, unconditional obligation to repay or return that which
would otherwise constitute a gain."'12 Only a legal obligation meets
the requirements of this exacting test. The "claim of right" doc-
trine was thus narrowed by the Court to a "claim of law" rule. If
ownership of money was claimed under a bona fide though ques-
tionable point of law, then the money would be taxable. Since the
embezzler's firm obligation to repay was discernible from the mo-
ment he took the money, the money would not be taxable even if
he never repaid it.13 Hence Wilcox stands for the proposition that a
taxpayer's income is measured by his legal responsibilities, not by
practical economic realities. 4
It was not long before the Supreme Court had to deal with
the income tax status of other wrongful gains. In Rutkin v. United
States,"5 the government sought to tax gain derived from extortion.
Wilcox was distinguished on the basis of common law property
principles: while an embezzler has no property interest in em-
bezzled funds because his victim is ignorant of the transaction, an
extortionist has a voidable property interest in his gain because
his victim is an active party to the transfer of the money. 6 A strict
reliance on the Wilcox rule would have freed both. the extortionist
and the embezzler from taxation, for both have an unqualified
12. Id. at 408.
13. The Court did not indicate whether the money would be income after the
statute of limitations had run.
14. See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). A law-abiding taxpayer had
received income under a mistaken claim of right. The Court emphasized that the tax-
payer "had at all times claimed and used the full $22,000 unconditionally as his own"
until the discovery of the mistake. Id. at 591. The Court found that the taxpayer had
correctly included the money as income in the year he received it. Certainly the average
embezzler enjoys his gains no less than did Lewis before his obligation was discovered.
The Wilcox approach permits the wrongdoer to enjoy his gain without tax liability, yet
the honest taxpayer must pay.
15. 843 U.S. 180 (1952).
16. 366 U.S. at 216.
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obligation to return what they illegally obtained. Rutkin, how-
ever, saw 9s the determinative factor not legal right to money,
but the ability of the taxpayer to divert it to his purposes, and
concluded that real economic gain to the taxpayer should be
taxed. Rutkin failed to notice that an embezzler also has real eco-
nomic gain.
Wilcox had exclfided from taxation money in the taxpayer's
possession to which he had no legal claim. Rutkin, however, ap-
plied a more expansive view of what constitutes income. Follow-
ing the lead of Judge Learned Hand,17 the Court found that do-
minion over money may result in taxation of the money under
the claim of right doctrine.18 The Court stressed that money "con-
stitutes taxable income when its recipient has such control over it
that, as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic
value from it."' 9 While the Court did not overrule Wilcox, by
emphasizing practical, economic realities the Court foreshadowed
the demise of the Wilcox approach in James v. United States.
II. JAMES V. UNITED STATES
Eugene C. James was convicted in United States District Court
of willfully attempting to evade federal income tax by failing to
include embezzled money as income in the year in which it was
misappropriated.20 The conviction was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit.21 James confronted the question of whether Wilcox would
continue to shield the embezzler from income taxation on his
wrongful gain. James in effect overruled Wilcox, 22 holding that
17. See note 5 supra.
18. Perhaps the central problem in Wilcox was the Court's failure to distinguish
"right" from "law," a distinction that was apparent to Judge Learned Hand. See note 5
supra. Right to money can be defined as the intention of the taker of the money to keep
it, coupled with the fact that possession of the money will usually permit him to use it
as he pleases. His intentions and his control are not directly relevant to his legal claim
to the money. The Wilcox rationale says in one breath that not only does the embezzler
have no gain, but also that the victim has no loss unless the embezzler's obligation is
worthless.
19. 343 U.S. at 137.
20. See I.R.C. § 7201.
21. 273 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1959).
22. Six justices agreed that the Wilcox case should be overruled. See the opinion
written by Chief Justice Warren and joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart. 366 U.S.
at 213. In concurring opinions on the issue of taxability, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter
agreed with so much of the Court's opinion "as dispatches Wilcox to a final demise."
Id. at 241. Justice Clark also joined in overruling the Wilcox case. Id. at 241.
The other major issue was whether James' evasion of tax was willful, since in the
year he failed to pay tax on his embezzled funds Wilcox was still ruling precedent. On
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funds subject to a legal obligation of repayment are immune from
taxation only if the obligation has been recognized. Quoting from
North American, the Court adopted the following approach to
what constitutes income:
Whef a taxpayer acquires earnings, lawfully or unlawfully,
without the consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obli-
gation to repay and without restriction as to its disposition, "he
has received income which he is required to return, even though
it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money,
and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent." 23
The first part of the James test was whether the taxpayer actually
had gain from his receipt or control of funds. If this prerequisite
were met, then the funds would be taxable unless there had been
a "consensual recognition of an obligation to repay."
The Court thus adopted a broad view of what constitutes
income. It relied on expansive definitions of income previously
stated in R-utkin24 and in two cases not involving funds misappro-
priated by taxpayers.25 The James Court abandoned the claim of
right doctrine developed in North American, because this doctrine
had been interpreted in Wilcox as a limitation on the taxation of
money received. 6 James was, however, much more than a simple
refutation of Wilcox. The Court argued that Congress' definition
of income had been read expansively by the courts, and that the
claim of right doctrine should not be applied to exclude from
this issue, the plurality dismissed, deciding that the tax consequences of their decision
would be given only prospective effect. Id. at 221-22. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the indictment. Id.
at 222.
23. 366 U.S. at 219 (quoting North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S.
at 424).
24. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
25. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Corliss v. Bowers,
281 U.S. 376 (1930). Glenshaw Glass defined income as "accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." 348 U.S. at 431. Corliss
saw as the significant attribute of gain "actual command over the property taxed-the
actual benefit for which the tax is paid." 281 U.S. at 378.
26. The Court specifically declined to answer the Commissioner's argument that
the claim of right doctrine, properly interpreted, decided only when an item should be
included in income, not what should be included, and, hence, could not prevent the in-
clusion of the embezzler's gain. 366 U.S. at 216 n.7. However, the need for an explana-
tion was obviated by the Court's expansion of its approach to income.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
taxation actual economic gain. In other words, real gain will be
presumed t6 be income, and the legality or illegality of the gain
will be of no import.
The Court did except bona fide, consensual loans from in-
come taxation. The limits of this exception, though, were not im-
mediately clear. Consent might mean the assent of either party
to the temporary tranifer of funds, 8 that is, recognition by either
the creditor or the debtor of the obligation to repay. James, how-
ever, must have intended consent to be more than recognition by
the embezzler of his obligation to repay the money, for many em-
bezzlers plan at the time they take money to return it eventually."
Nor, under James, could the consent of the former owner alone
be sufficient. First, the victim of an embezzlement was unaware of
the transfer, and thus could not have consented to it. Second, most
victims insist on the embezzler's obligation to repay; to allow
assertion of this obligation to bar taxation would be to resurrect
the Wilcox rule, a result contrary to the clear holding of James.
The only workable definition of consent in the James context
is that it requires (1) knowledge by the one whose money is trans-
ferred that it has been borrowed, and (2) willingness of the re-
cipient to repay it. "Consent" has been defined as any "concur-
rence of wills,"30 or an "agreement; the act or result of coming
into harmony or accord. "3 1 Reciprocity is absent in wrongful ap-
propriations, but a bona fide loan embodies it-the lender parts
with his money with the understanding that the borrower will re-
27. See text accompanying notes 7 & 23 supra. Of some importance in understand-
ing the Court's approach may be the Court's change in North American's definition of
income as "receives earnings" to "acquires earnings." In tax law, receipt often means
actual physical possession. Hence, courts have felt the need for the doctrine of construc-
tive receipt, which imposes taxation on items which the taxpayer has the right to receive
but does not yet actually possess. "Acquire" has no such limited meaning in tax theory.
Its meaning, "[t]o gain by any means," WVEBTR's NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 23
(2d ed.), expresses the Court's decision to apply a broad test for income. See notes 24-25
supra & accompanying text.
28. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 377 (4th ed. 1968).
29. See Moore v. United States, 412 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1969). In an elaborate
swindle, the taxpayer fraudulently obtained loans from financial institutions using false
notes as security. The trial court found that the taxpayer had at all times intended to
see that the banks were repaid, but the court of appeals concluded that his consent by
itself was insufficient to meet the requirement of consensual recognition. The lenders
would not have made the loans had they known the taxpayer had misrepresented his
security, and they did not consent to the transactions that in fact occurred. Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the loans were taxable as income to the taxpayer.




pay; the borrower obtains the money only upon his agreement that
the money will be repaid. James recognized that while this con-
sensual standard "brings wrongful appropriations within the broad
sweep of 'gross income,' it excludes loans. "32
The exception of loans from gross income has been a funda-
mental proposition of income tax law from its inception.3 The
rule has been justified by its necessity for business and by the pre-
sumption that loans will be repaid. Nonetheless, the proceeds of
a loan are in actuality gain, and would be taxed if this policy ex-
ception were not made. There can be no doubt that a loan im-
proves a borrower's economic position, because it permits him
now to do or acquire something that he would not otherwise be
able to do or acquire until later. Some claim that since the gain
is temporary, it really is not gain. A fundamental premise of the
cash basis method of accounting for taxation, however, is that a
taxpayer must account for his receipts even though they are offset
by liabilities that the taxpayer must honor later. A loan, in effect,
is a transfer of the right to future payments in exchange for cash;
by obtaining a loan, a taxpayer has anticipated future income.35
This analysis has generally been accepted by the courts, but
decisions have split on two points. The first is at which time the
parties must consent to the transfer and future repayment of money
in order to exclude the recipient's gain from income taxation. The
second is whether the courts should look behind the formal aspects
of a transaction to the subjective intentions of the parties in order
to determine whether consensual recognition was present.
III. CONSENSUAL RECOGNITION
A. Timing
The lower courts have differed in their treatment of the effect
of consensual recognition given not at the time of the initial trans-
action, but sometime thereafter. The situation, though having
32. James v. United States, 366 U.S. at 219.
33. See generally 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 5.12 (1974 rev. ed.).
34. Of course, not all loans are repaid. Tax law does not require a loan to be in-
cluded in gross income until the debt has been forgiven by the lender (when cancella-
tion of the debt is not a gift), or until the debt has become unenforceable because the
statute of limitations has run. See generally 5 MERTENS, supra note 33, § 2833 (1975 rev.
ed.).
35. For a discussion of the relation between "sale" and "loan," see Joyce & Del
Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved
and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAx L. REv. 121, 172-73 n.176 (1976).
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many variations, is basically this: A embezzles, steals, or mistakenly
obtains monies from V (the victim); sometime thereafter, V dis-
covers the problem, A and V recognize the debt, and both agree
on terms for repayment.
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service has in-
variably analyzed this scenario according to common accounting
principles. If the initial transfer of money took place without the
knowledge and consent of both parties, the recipient will be
required to include the money in his gross income. If the recipient
is a cash-basis taxpayer, then he will not be permitted to offset
income with a subsequent promise to repay the monies." Only
actual repayment in the year of the initial transaction will elimi-
nate tax liability.
The Commissioner's view has received inconsistent treatment
in the courts. It is clear that his view is followed if the agreement
to repay is entered into after the taxable year of receipt T There
is conflict among the courts, however, as to the effect of an agree-
ment entered into in the same year as the initial transaction.
In United States v. Merrill,8 s decided before James, the Ninth
Circuit presented one side of the debate. The taxpayer received
funds under a mistaken claim of right, recognized his mistake, and
made provision to repay the funds, all in the same taxable year-
1940. He repaid the money in 1943. The court ruled that the tax-
payer's renunciation of his claim to the money, if made in the
same year as his receipt of the money, was sufficient to negate the
presumption that the money was income to him.
In Mais v. Commissioner,89 decided after James, the Tax
Court distinguished Merrill. Within one taxable year the taxpayer
had embezzled funds and the parties had agreed to terms for re-
payment. To the taxpayer's reliance on Merrill, the court replied:
36. Under the cash basis method of accounting, income and receipts are reported
in the year received, and deductions and credits are taken in 'the year payments justifying
them are made. I.R.C. §§ 451 (a), 461 (a). See generally J. CHozIE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 82 (1973). A taxpayer on the accrual method may offset income with an
agreement to repay since the liability is fixed. Whitaker v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 379,
382 (5th Cir. 1958).
37. E.g., Norman v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1337 (3d Cir. 1969) ; United States V.
Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954). In Norman, the taxpayer embezzled funds from
1958 through 1962. When he was apprehended, the taxpayer agreed to repay the funds
over a five-year period. The Third Circuit concluded that the monies would be income
in the year taxpayer received them, for to hold otherwise would violate the integrity of
the taxable year.
38. 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
39. 51 T.C. 494 (1968).
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We interpret the James case as meaning that any taxpayer who
acquires property under circumstances which do not permit the
conclusion that the property was received with a consensual recog-
nition... is in receipt of taxable income. Certainly in the case of
an embezzlement it cannot be considered that the funds are ob-
tained by the embezzler under a consensual recognition of an obli-
gation to repay; indeed, the victim of the embezzlement is unaware
of the diversion of his property.40
The court believed that the honest taxpayer in Merrill had the
tacit consent of the person whose money he had received. 41
Six years later the Tax Court reversed itself. In Buff v. Com-
missioner,42 the taxpayer embezzled funds from his employer, was
discovered, and immediately agreed to repay-all in the same year.
The amounts remained unpaid seven years later. The Tax Court
followed Merrill and concluded that the sums were not income
to the taxpayer in the year of their receipt.
In its appeal of the Buff case to the Second Circuit, the gov-
ernment presented two major arguments. The first argument, fol-
lowing Mais, was that true consensual recognition can occur only
when funds are transferred; 43 the second was that the agreement
to repay was only a sham.44 The Second Circuit declined to base
its decision on the first argument, for it concluded that James
simply had not addressed the question of when consensual recog-
nition must be given if the recipient of money is to escape taxa-
tion.4 5 The Buff court was able to avoid the question by holding
that the transaction was a sham: that is, the embezzler had made
no payment or offsetting promise of any value.46 Buff explicitly
left open the question of whether embezzled funds may be ex-
40. Id. at 498.
41. The Supreme Court had not found this sufficient in United States v. Lewis,
340 U.S. 590 (1951). See note 14 supra.
42. 496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 58 T.C. 224 (1972).
43. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
44. 496 F.2d at 848.
45. Id. at 849.
46. The decision rested on the absence of consensual recognition at the time of the
agreement to repay. The court looked to objective circumstances at the time of the agree-
ment, not to the embezzler's subsequent failure to repay. When the taxpayer made the
agreement, his resources and prospects were clearly inadequate to cover the amount
owed. Therefore, the court found that the embezzler's intent to repay was not, in fact,
bona fide.
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cluded from the embezzler's gross income if, later in the same year
in which he took the funds, he in fact agrees to repay them.4"
In the last major treatment of this problem, the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in Quinn v. Commissioner,4 decided in favor of the Com-
missioner. 49 Concluding that a taxpayer has income unless con-
sensual recognition is present at the time of receipt, the court
found that Merrill was "incorrectly decided" and would not be
applied in the Seventh Circuit.
The Tax Court in Quinn0 indicated indirectly another rea-
son why consensual recognition given after money has been trans-
ferred should never permit the recipient to escape taxation. In a
single year, the taxpayer withdrew money without authorization
from the firm which employed him, admitted his debt, and made
provision for its repayment. There was no question of the tax-
payer's honest commitment to repay, for his obligation was secured
by his interest in a land trust. For this reason, the Tax Court
found Buff distinguishable. As in Buff, though, the court did not
rely on the mere existence of an agreement, but looked to the true
intent of the parties. The court noted that it was against state law
for the victim, a corporation, to have loaned money to the tax-
payer, its principal shareholder, and that, after the taking, the
victim had no alternative but to accept the taxpayer's note. Since
the corporation's consent was not truly voluntary, the court con-
cluded that the money was income to the recipient. The sense of
the court's opinion is that consent must be active, not just passive
acquiescence to a fait accomplit. Without doubt, consensual recog-
nition by the victim after the fact is always less than truly volun-
47. A related problem is whether the recipient of money must include it in his
income when consensual recognition is present at the time of the initial transaction, but
when the amount of his obligation is not fixed until later. In Gaddy v, Commissioner,
38 T.C. 943 (1962), modified, 344 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1965), the taxpayer received pay-
ments which, under the terms of a contract, were subsequently determined to be return-
able as overcharges. The court found that both the taxpayer and the party he con-
tracted with had always recognized the taxpayer's legal obligation to honor the contract,
and since the amount due was made definite in the same taxable year, the overpayments
were not income to the taxpayer. Gaddy dealt with a cash-basis taxpayer. Accord, Bates
Motor Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 151 (1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 20 (7th
Cir. 1952) (accrual-method taxpayer).
48. 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Rappaport v. United States, 419 F. Supp.
1236 (N.D. ill. 1976).
49. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
50. 62 T.C. 223 (1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975).
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tary and should not be used to prevent taxation. The entire trans-
action is in the nature of a forced loan:"
The Second Circuit in Gilbert v. Commissioner has recently*
added a new wrinkle to this problem. 2 The taxpayer, president
of a corporation, took money with the knowledge of some of the
corporation's officers and directors, and used it to protect stock
options that he held for the benefit of the corporation. Immedi-
ately thereafter, the president sought ratification of the transaction,
but this was refused. He therefore assigned to the corporation per-
sonal assets sufficient to secure his obligation. The Tax Court con-
cluded that since the victim corporation had not formally con-
sented to the transfer when it first occurred, the money was income
to the taxpayer. 3
The Second Circuit reversed, finding there had been express
consensual recognition of an obligation to repay, because "the
secretary of the corporation, who signed the checks, the officers
and directors to whom Gilbert gave contemporaneous notification,
and Gilbert himself were all aware that the transaction was in the
nature of a loan."54 Furthermore, on several previous occasions the
taxpayer had withdrawn money for corporate purposes without
authorization and in each case his actions had been approved. The
implication of the Second Circuit's holding in Gilbert is that a
taxpayer is not taxable on money he takes from a corporation, even
though the corporation does not ratify his action, if his expecta-
tion of the corporation's consent is reasonable and both his intent
and ability to repay are established.
B. Piercing the Form of a Transaction
The courts have also asked whether a transaction that looks
like a loan is, in fact, a loan. In determining whether consensual
51. Certainly the question can be asked why a forced loan should not be treated
as a loan. One answer is that the government does not wish to encourage wrongful ap-
propriations by permitting wrongdoers to take advantage of the favorable tax treatment
afforded to bona fide loans. More important, however, the question of what constitutes
income initially depends on what is fair to the taxpayer. Clearly, one who wrongfully
takes money cannot claim it is unfair to tax him on his gain. If he subsequently repays
the money, he may be entitled to a deduction. On the other hand, fairness to the victim
should be taken into consideration when the government intends to enforce its claim
for a tax deficiency. See note 65 infra.
52. Gilbert v. Commissioner, No. 76-4170 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 1977), rev'g Edward M.
Gilbert, 1976 T.C.M. (P--1) 76,104.
53. Edward M. Gilbert, 1976 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,104.
54. Gilbert v. Commissioner, No. 76-4170, slip op. at 7.
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recognition is present, the majority of courts, relying on the James
objective of'recognizing economic realities, hold that the substance
of a transaction determines income tax liability. These courts re-
quire that both parties intend to establish a debt which will be
repaid. Otherwise, the proceeds will be taxable to the recipient
in the year he receives them. The courts have allowed the parties'
subjective intent to be established by objective circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction.5
This view was adopted in United States v. Rochelle." The
taxpayer had fraudulently induced others to lend him money, and
the trial court found that he never had any intention of repaying
the loans. The Fifth Circuit found this sufficient grounds to de-
termine that the James test of consensual recognition had not been
met and held the amounts received to be income to the taxpayer,
although the lenders had treated and continued to treat the trans-
actions as loans.
In Fairchild v. Commissioner, 7 the taxpayer had borrowed
large sums of money over many years to finance a business venture.
He did not repay any of the money. Though actual fraud was not
found, the Tax Court, employing an analysis similar to that later
used in Buff, stressed that the taxpayer had borrowed money re-
peatedly despite his inability to repay it. The court concluded that
the taxpayer never intended to repay the sums and that the pur-
ported loans were shams.
A number of decisions suggest an opposing view that circum-
vents economic realities and indicates that the legal form of a
transaction should determine whether the recipient of money must
include it in his gross income. According to this view, the loan
agreement is not pierced to determine whether it is bona fide-
that is, whether both parties intended the transaction to be a loan.
In In re Diversified Brokers Co., 8 the taxpayer was a corporation,
the primary purpose of which had been to borrow large sums of
money and to make substantial dividend payments to its share-
holders out of the proceeds. Because of the high interest rates at
which the money was borrowed, the corporation would have been
unable to repay the money even if it had not distributed dividends.
55. See text accompanying notes 42-51 supra.
56. 384 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
57. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1505 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 462 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1972).
58. 487 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1973).
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The loans were obtained by fraudulent statements and promises,
but, in order to encourage new lenders to part with their money,
the corporation promptly paid all loans due up until the moment
it went bankrupt. 9
Other cases dealing with fraudulent corporate loan schemes
had held that the loan proceeds were income In In re Home &
Mortgage Corp.,60 for example, a federal district court found that
fraud in the acquisition of a loan together with the debtor cor-
poration's inability to repay proved that the corporation never in-
tended to make good on the loans. The bankrupt corporation was
therefore "deemed not to have incurred any obligation to repay
and [was] taxed on the economic benefits realized from the trans-
action." 61
Despite these precedents, the Eighth Circuit found for the
taxpayer in In re Diversified Brokers Co. The court gave two
reasons for its ruling. First, the transactions satisfied the require-
ment of consensual recognition; second, the corporation had re-
ceived no benefit from the loans.2
The court, looking at the bona fides of the transaction, stressed
that both the borrower and the lenders had at all times treated
the transactions as loans, and that some money had been repaid.63
The court reached its decision despite findings that the borrower
could not possibly repay all the loans, and that the corporation
had made no effort to use the loan proceeds in a way which con-
ceivably could have increased its ability to repay-thus, there could
be no doubt that the principal officers and shareholders of the
corporation intended never to tepay all the loans.
Ignoring intent, the court of appeals relied on the district
court's finding that the corporation considered the transactions to
be loans. The appellate court divorced the intent of the officers
and shareholders from that of their corporation. The court looked
to the independent legal existence of the corporation and to the
59. Id.
60. In re Home & Mtge. Corp., No. B-189-167 (D.N.J. 1971), cited in In re Diversi-
fied Brokers Co., 355 F. Supp. 76, 86 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
61. Quoted in Diversified, 355 F. Supp. at 89. See also United States v. Rosenthal,
470 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1972). The court upheld a conviction for corporate tax evasion on
similar facts. The defendant did not contest the trial court's finding of tax liability, but
appealed on different grounds.
62. 487 F.2d at 358. For discussion of the court's benefit analysis, see text accom-
panying notes 67-72 infra.
63. The decision was 2 to 1. Judge Heaney wrote the opinion of the court, and
Judge Ross concurred in a separate opinion.
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legal form of its obligation in order to divine corporate intent,
disregarding the intent of all the people who together constituted
the corporation.6 4
Judge Ross, in his concurring opinion, admitted that under
James the money received "could be considered income to the
bankrupt corporation. 65 James, he noted, did not deal with the
issue of whether the government should take the bankrupt corpo-
ration's assets at the victim's expense, and, therefore, was not con-
trolling.66 Although such equitable considerations often influence
the courts,6 7 the priority of government claims over those of other
creditors really has nothing to do with the question of whether an
item should be included in income.6"
64. The court scrutinized carefully the formal aspects of the transaction, as well
as the negotiations and other dealings between the lenders and the corporation, in order
to ascertain the corporation's intent. Disregarding all those factors which showed a
fraudulent scheme, the court concluded that everyone involved had treated the trans-
actions as loans. It can be presumed, however, that if the scheme had been discovered
before the corporation went into bankruptcy, the lenders would very quickly have de-
manded repayment. The lenders' consent was obtained by fraud; true mutuality was
lacking.
This analysis was not followed by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Swallow,
511 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 (1975), involving facts similar to
Diversified. Swallow erroneously distinguished Diversified on the ground that the loans
in Swallow were obtained in bad faith. The Diversified court, however, would have con-
sidered it important that the corporation in Swallow did use some of the borrowed
money for corporate purposes. For further discussion, see notes 69.96 infra & accompany-
ing text.
65. 487 F.2d at 359 (Ross, J., concurring).
66. The majority in James must have been aware of this issue, however, because
it was specifically mentioned in a dissenting opinion. 366 U.S. at 227-29 (Black, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
67. An example is Scudder v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 222, rehearing denied, 410
F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'g 48 T.C. 36 (1967). The husband of a member of a partner-
ship had misappropriated money from the partnership. The Commissioner attempted to
enforce the tax deficiency against the wrongdoer's spouse as co-maker of the joint return.
The Tax Court held in favor of the Commissioner. 48 T.C. 36 (1967). Appalled at this
result, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding first that the receipt was an
unauthorized loan which was not income, 405 F.2d at 227, and second, on motion for
rehearing, that even if the funds had been embezzled, James did not reach these facts,
410 F.2d at 690. Congress wisely responded to the Tax Court decision, not by modifying
James, but with I.R.C. § 6013 (e), which protects a spouse who is both unaware of the
other spouse's income and does not benefit from it. Clearly it is preferable for courts to
be forced by statute to consider equitable principles in all these cases rather than for
the courts to be free to continue to rely on concepts of fairness only in isolated cases.
68. The problem of enforcement of income tax deficiencies against bankrupts is
often the true reason that courts shy away from strict application of the James doctrine.
Income tax due but not paid on demand "shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person." I.R.C. § 6321. Such a lien is satisfied before the interests of other creditors are
considered, except as follows:
The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any purchaser,
holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor until
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IV. THE CONCEPT OF GAIN IN JAMES
As has been seen,69 James established a two-step procedure
for determining whether it is appropriate to tax a party. First, the
taxpayer's control over the. money is examined without regard to
its lawfulness. Second, the circumstances of the transaction are re-
,viewed to determine if the parties intended the transaction to be
a loan. If the parties so intended, the recipient need not pay tax
on the money regardless of his control over it.
The trial court in Diversified70 cited Rochelle's summary of
Wilcox, Rutkin, and James as a proper explication of the first step
of the James analysis:
[T]he Supreme Court has now finally concluded that the economic
benefit accruing to a taxpayer from the receipt of money is the
controlling factor in determining whether the receipt is "income." 71
James, properly interpreted, did attempt to bring income tax
theory into harmony with economic realities. Both the trial and
appellate courts in Diversified concluded, however, that receipt is
not prima facie proof of income, even if both consensual recogni-
tion and substantial restriction on use of the money are absent.
notice thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed
by the Secretary or his delegate.
I.R.C. § 6323 (a).
State law governs the taxpayer's property interest in his gains. Acquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960). If the victim of an embezzlement can perform the almost
impossible task of tracing the movement of his property while it is still in the hands of
the embezzler, the government's lien cannot attach to it. On the other hand, an ex-
tortionist has a voidable title in his misappropriations, so a lien can attach. See Rutkin
v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). Also, a taxpayer who has obtained loans fraudu-
lently has an interest to which the lien can attach. See United States v. Rochelle, 334
F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967). Therefore, the government takes the wrongdoer's assets before
the victim's claim is considered, unless the victim can win the race to the courthouse
and become a judgment creditor before the government accomplishes the one prerequi-
site to its recovery-notification in the prescribed manner.
Confusion over whether'an item is income or property to which a lien can attach
is not uncommon. An example is the way in which Rutkin distinguished Wilcox, invok-
ing a rationale the Supreme Court subsequently rejected in James. See text accompanying
note 16 supra. But whatever the conclusion, misappropriated funds can also be used to
satisfy other claims the government might have. This is Congress' design, and a court
will not even consider other valid governmental purposes. See Campbell v. Campbell,
88 N.J. Super. 63, 210 A.2d 644 (1965) (levy on alimony payments upheld even though
the former wife-the taxpayer-and her child, deprived of the alimony, would be forced
to go on welfare).
69. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
70. In re Diversified Brokers Co., 355 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 355
(8th Cir. 1973).
71. 355 F. Supp. at 85 (paraphrasing United States v. Rochelle, 384 U.S. at 751).
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'One who receives money must benefit from the receipt if he is to
be taxed ofi it." The court of appeals found that the money re-
ceived did not benefit the corporation, but only its shareholders,
and concluded that the corporation need not include the money
in its gross income. In denying that the corporation's receipt of
the funds, by itself, was sufficient to subject the corporation to
taxation, the court viblated the general rule that a corporation is
taxed on its gains whether or not they are distributed to its share-
holders.7 3 Further, the corporation did benefit by having the
ability to distribute earnings to its shareholders.7 4
This narrow and distorted reading of James has not been
followed. Other courts have found support in James for the
broader proposition that a person's control over the disposition of
funds provides adequate justification for taxing him even when he
has not actually received the funds. In Gradsky v. Commissioner,0
a corporation owned by the taxpayer obtained loans fraudulently,
with no intention of repaying them. The money was dispersed by
the corporation to the taxpayer's business and to others controlled
by his family. The taxpayer's argument was that neither he nor
the recipient corporation benefited from the portion of the money
that went into other businesses in which he had no interest. The
court rejected this view and found that the taxpayer "had such
command, control, and dominion over these funds ... that as a
practical matter, he realized economic gain and benefit. 77
Other courts, going further than Gradsky, have concluded that
direct benefit-benefit from the money itself-is not the sine qua
non of income. In Bailey v. Commissioner,7 8 the taxpayer em-
bezzled money from a bank by falsifying the books to show de-
posits in her brother's account. The brother withdrew the funds
72. 487 F.2d at 358; 355 F. Supp. at 85.
73. See- National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). Exceptions to this rule derive
from specific statutory exemptions. The Diversified court may have had in mind the
subchapter S corporation for which, if certain conditions are met and all profits are in-
cluded in its shareholders' income, there will be no corporate liability for taxes. See
I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379. This exception to the general rule permits small numbers of in-
vestors to enjoy the advantage of the corporate form without its additional tax liability.
74. The distinction the court made between direct consumption and conferral of
the right to consume on another has, in another context, been condemned by the Supreme
Court. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
75. United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
845 (1975).
76. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 625 (1970).
77. Id. at 635.
78. 52 T.C. 115, affd, 420 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1969).
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and spent them on himself. In reply to the taxpayer's contention
that she neither received nor benefited from the money, the Tax
Court quoted from a previous case:
"That may be one way to describe it [the transaction]. An-
other, equally valid, is that the funds came to * * * (the embezzler)
and were passed out or made available by her to the beneficiaries.
These beneficiaries were the objects of * * * (the embezzler's)
bounty, not the bank's. She was the force and fulcrum which made
those benefits possible. She assumed unto herself actual command
over the funds. This is enough." 79
The court refused to *rely either on the unlawfulness of direct
receipt of the funds by the taxpayer, or on the fact that she did
not directly benefit from the use of the funds. The court implied,
however, that the taxpayer actually benefited from having the
power to confer economic gain on others of her own choosing.
Thus, underlying the court's determination is the notion that the
taxpayer both generated and controlled the disposition of the gain.
Bailey ignored a prior Tax Court case that suggests a differ-
ent result. In Teschner v. Commissioner,0 the taxpayer entered
a contest that required participants over a certain age to choose
a person under that age to be the recipient of the prize. The tax-
payer had picked his daughter. The Tax Court found that since
the taxpayer had no right to receive the prize himself, the prize
was not income to him.
In Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.,"'
Bailey's interpretation of James was indirectly questioned by
the Supreme Court, which chose instead to follow the tradition of
Teschner. Here, a bank and an insurance company, both of which
were wholly owned subsidiaries of one holding company, had
been involved in the sale of insurance policies to the bank's custo-
mers. When a customer of the bank wanted insurance on a loan,
the bank completed all of the required forms and collected the
premiums. It forwarded the forms and payments to the insurance
company, which assumed the entire risk of the insurance. The in-
surance company included the premiums in its own corporate in-
come tax return. Using section 482, the Commissioner attempted
79. Id. at 119 (quoting Estate of Geiger v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 221, 231-32 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1012 (1966)).
80. 38 T.C. 1003 (1962).
81. 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
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to reallocate some of the income from the insurance company to
the bank. 2
The Court found that it was usual business practice for the
insurance company to pay a sales commission, amounting to be-
tween 40 and 55 percent of the net premiums it received, to any-
one who sold its policies.83 In this case the bank sold the policies,
received the proceeds, and disposed of the income to a party of its
choosing-the affiliated insurance corporation. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held that the commissions were not taxable to the
bank, because under federal law it was illegal for a national bank
to profit from the sale of insurance to its customers.4
The Utah Court first decided that generation of income alone
was not sufficient to impose taxation.81 This must be true; other-
wise, an employee who generates far more income in the course
of his employment than he is paid would pay tax on all that he
generates, even though he has traded his capacity to generate in-
come for the highest price he can get and can never actually earn
the amount of income he generates. Logic requires that the em-
ployee control the disposition of money before he can be taxed on
it. In assessing what degree of control over the funds should give
rise to tax liability under both section 482 and section 61, the
majority of the Court found it necessary to apply an assump-
tion that appears in the regulations under section 482 80 -"com-
82. I.R.C. § 482 gives the Commissioner the power to reallocate income and de-
ductions among affiliated organizations if necessary in order "to prevent evasion of taxes
or clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations ... .
The Commissioner wanted to reallocate the income because life insurance corpora-
tions are taxed at an effectively lower rate than banks. See I.R.C. §§ 801-802.
83. 405 U.S. at 397. Further, the facts disclosed that even before the holding com
pany formed its own separate insurance company to take over the insurance from inde-
pendent insurance companies, one of the holding company's subsidiaries, Ed. D. Smith &
Sons, had received the commissions from the independent carriers although the sub-
sidiary had no other relation to this particular insurance business. 436 F.2d at 1194.
84. 405 U.S. at 401-02.
85. In Utah, the Court directly opposed the generation of income theory, which
had been the foundation of Bailey, decided under James, and had been followcd by both
the Tax Court in Utah, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1320 (1967), rev.d, 436 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir.
1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 394 (1972), and the Seventh Circuit in Local Fin. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 956 (1969). Under the genera-
tion of income doctrine, a taxpayer who designates an entity to perform services and
exercises control over that entity is taxable on income produced by such services. The
generation of income doctrine has been described as a corollary of the assignment of
income doctrine. Both look to who controls the income. The assignment of income doc-
trine focuses on the power to dispose of income, while the generation of income doctrine
focuses on the power to create income.
86. 405 U.S. at 398. Complete power is mentioned as an assumption in Treas. Reg.
§ 1A82-1 (b) (1968). Utah is the first to employ it in determining whether income exists
under I.R.C. § 61.
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plete power" of the taxpayer over the funds-as a prerequisite to
taxation. 7 The Court held that only complete freedom of the
holding company to "shift income among its subsidiaries"88 could
justify taxing the bank for the commissions it earned but did not
receive. The Court concluded:
It is only where this power exists, and has been exercised in
such a way that the "true taxable income" of a subsidiary has
been understated, that the Commissioner is authorized to reallocate
under § 482. But [the parent corporation] had no such power un-
less it acted in violation of federal banking laws. The "complete
power" referred to in the regulations hardly includes the power to
force a subsidiary to violate the law.89
Justice Blackmun, in dissent,90 attacked the majority's defini-
tion of control and its restrictive view of income. He claimed that
section 482 was "designed to produce for tax purposes, and to rec-
ognize, economic realities and to have the tax consequences follow
those realities and not some structured unrealities.""1
Utah, if not properly limited to its facts, may weaken the au-
thority of James as precedent for the principle of ignoring legal
formalities in favor of economic realities. The insurance company
in Utah would not have earned the premiums without the efforts
of the bank; rather than accept the commissions customarily paid
for this work, the bank simply transferred them to another branch
of the corporate group. Thus, the bank both generated the com-
87. An examination of the purposes of section 482 sheds some light on the effect
of the Court's interpretation. First, section 482 is an amalgam of several important tax
theories, "tax avoidance principles, assignment-of-income notions, general deduction theo-
ries, and clear reflection of income under the parties' accounting methods." B. Brrriax
& J. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 15.06.
Second, section 482 can be used by the Commissioner to create income in a situation
where normally there would be none. See Commissioner v. B. Forman Co., 453 F.2d 1144
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972); Loening,
Section 482 Allocations Resulting in the Creation of Income or in Constructive Dividends
to Shareholders, 80 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAX 1247 (1972). Creation of income is illus-
trated in Forman, where corporation X lent money to an affiliate corporation Y at no
interest. The Second Circuit included a five-percent interest payment (though never
made) in X's income, and gave Y a comparable deduction. The court found this out-
come required even if Y, the borrower, had not made a profit on the loan. Ordinarily,
under assignment of income principles a party is taxable only on gain. The assumption
or requirement of "complete power" in the context of section 482 may suggest that a
greater degree of control is necessary to create income in the affiliated corporation
setting. This quantum of control should not be required for normal income taxation
under section 61.
88. 405 U.S. at 401.
89. Id. at 404-05.
90. Id. at 418 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 419.
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missions and controlled their disposition. Only extreme attention
to a legal formality-the illegality of retaining the commissions-
prevented the determination that this money was income to the
bank.
The doctrine of complete power may, however, be short lived;
this restrictive approach was not used by the Supreme Court in a
later case, United States v. Basye.92 A medical partnership, Perma-
nente, had contracted with a corporation, Kaiser, to provide serv-
ices to Kaiser's members. As partial payment for the medical serv-
ices provided by Permanente, Kaiser established a retirement trust
for Permanente's partners and certain of its individual employees.
The Court held that Permanente and its individual partners were
taxable at the time money was contributed to the trust, even
though it was impossible to tell then whether any of the individual
partners would ever actually receive any of the money. It was clear,
however, that the money was forever lost to Kaiser.
The Court did not disturb the trial court's factual finding
that Kaiser was unwilling to make any other direct payments to
the partners, so "Permanente could not have received that income
except in the form in which it was received. 9 3 The Court deter-
mined that once the government showed that Permanente had
earned the money, it "need not prove that the taxpayer had com-
plete and unrestricted power to designate the manner and form in
which this income is received." 94
Utah had expressed the view that the taxpayer must have com-
plete power to receive commissions in order to be taxed on them.
In Basye, strict application of this view would have permitted
Permanente to escape immediate taxation. But since the facts of
the two cases are not directly parallel, it is not clear what degree
of control the Supreme Court in the future will deem necessary
to justify imposition of income tax liabilityY5
92. 410 U.S. 441 (1973). The court of appeals in Utah, in concluding that the
bank was not taxable, looked not only to Teschner, see text accompanying note 80 supra,
but also to the district court decision in Basye v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), af'd, 450 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 441 (1973), which held
that the partners were not taxable. 436 F.2d at 1197.
93. 410 U.S. at 451.
94. Id. at 452.
95. There is one way to challenbe Basye without questioning its broad approach to
income taxation. Section 83 provides:
If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to
any person other than the person for whom such services are performed ...
[the profit] shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed
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Similarly, the Court's treatment of income in Basye does not
directly address the extent of Utah's influence on James. The
Supreme Court in Utah stated that it left intact James and, pre-
sumably, Commissioner v. Bailey. Utah sought to distinguish
James by saying that in James "the illegality involved was the act
which gave rise to the income. ' 96
James held that an embezzler has enough control over his
illegal gains so that they may properly be treated as taxable in-
come, although he has a legal duty to repay them. Bailey took
James one step further by finding that the fact that the embezzler
did not receive the funds himself will not, in itself, disturb the
notion of the embezzler's control over the funds.
Utah found that in order to impose taxation, "complete
power" or complete control over the funds must exist; the bank's
inability legally to receive the commissions deprived the bank of
this "complete power," preventing taxationf 7 It is too simplistic
to conclude that Utah was wrongly decided because it ignored the
James determination that the legality or illegality of receipts
should not be a factor in assessing taxation. What James did say
was that the legal obligation to repay is, by itself, merely a formal
factor with little practical reality. A similar analysis in Utah would
have led to the conclusion that the legal inability to receive the
commissions had, in the bank's situation, little practical effect
because the bank controlled the disposition of the funds.
Basye, on the other hand, has revived the James notion that
a taxpayer may be taxed on gains even if his control over them
is not complete. All factors in an individual case must be ex-
amined in order to determine the practical degree of control a
such services in the first taxable year in which the rights of the person having
the beneficial interest in such property... are not subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture ....
I.R.C. § 83 (a). Substantial risk of forfeiture is defined as follows:
The rights of a person in property are subject to a substantial risk of for-
feiture if such person's rights to full enjoyment of such property are condi-
tioned upon the future performance of substantial services by any individual.
I.R.C. § 83 (c) (1). Certainly, Permanente's partners had a contingent right that would
be forfeited if they did not continue to serve Kaiser. Of course, if section 83 had been
applied, Kaiser would have been forced to postpone its deduction until each partner
had been taxed. See I.R.C. § 83 (h).
The fact that the case dealt with partners and not with regular employees can be
used to justify the Court's opinion, section 83 notwithstanding. The majority of the
partners, as a group, could have terminated the entire trust and received their share of
the money. Their power to do this may have prevented the application of section 83.
96. 405 U.S. at 405.
97. See text accompanying notes 81-89 supra.
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taxpayer has over funds. In Basye, the partners who were taxed
had only limited control over the funds, and Basye is therefore
difficult in this respect to reconcile with Utah, where the bank's
control over the commissions, although they were not received, was
fairly extensive. Though Basye provides a clue in assessing the
degree of control necessary to impose taxation, it appears that in
practice taxation under the generation of income theory will de-
pend on certain factual distinctions.
A comparison of Utah, Teschner, and Bailey, however, re-
veals the application of a consistent theory of taxation. But for
the efforts of the taxpayers in generating the income, there would
have been no benefit for them to confer on others. In Utah and
Teschner, the taxpayers were not taxed, but the taxpayer in Bailey
was. Utah and Teschner concluded that to have taxable gain, the
taxpayer whose efforts economically benefit others must volun-
tarily relinquish the right to receive the money. Under this view,
Bailey, of course can be reconciled with Utah and Teschner be-
cause the taxpayer could just as easily have embezzled the money
for herself as for her brother.
These three cases do, then, offer a rational basis for deciding
whether or not a taxpayer who assigns income to another should
be taxed: only the taxpayer who voluntarily chooses not to receive
the income is subject to taxation. Bayse, however, suggests that
less than complete power may justify taxation. The taxpayers in
Basye voluntarily generated income knowing the form in which it
would be received. Their decision to accept a special indirect form
of payment for their services was held to permit taxation. Similarly,
in Utah, Teschner, and Bailey the taxpayers voluntarily generated
income and conferred it on parties of their own choosing. Cer-
tainly, courts can in fairness rely on such voluntary choices to
determine that a taxpayer has had gain.
CONCLUSION
Under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress,
with certain statutory exceptions, has delegated to the courts the
duty to define the scope of income. Using the traditional broad
construction of section 61, James formulated a test of income
that accords with economic realities. For the most part, the
courts have zealously limited the exceptions to this formulation.
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Utah did not overrule James, but merely distinguished it
and, in so doing, left it free to operate in the field of wrongful
appropriations. It is not clear, however, whether Utah will restrict
James' broader conclusion that the practical effect of economic
activity is determinative of income taxation. The Basye decision
is the clearest indication that the spirit of James is still alive.
WILLIAM B. BARKER

